Posts Tagged ‘end-to-end encryption’

EPX Welcomes Third-Party Validations of Tokenization and Payment Processing Outsourcing

Tuesday, July 20th, 2010

Editor’s Note: It’s always encouraging to see EPX competitors follow in our footsteps. Just as competitors are following our lead by touting the benefits of tokenization technology, several competitors are even beginning to issue press releases that mirror ours. I guess imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.

Electronic Payment Exchange (EPX), a full-service payment processing organization, announced today that their organization welcomes the recent third-party validations of cardholder data tokenization and payment processing outsourcing. Newly announced global industry best practices for tokenization from Visa Inc. validate EPX’s long-standing deployment of tokenization technology for securing cardholder data. Additionally, a June 2010 security brief from RSA supports EPX’s approach to tokenized payment processing outsourcing by referencing an EPX client case study that shows how tokenization and payment processing outsourcing reduce merchant costs and other burdens associated with securing cardholder data.

The recent release of Visa’s tokenization best practices provides valuable guidance to merchant organizations seeking to utilize tokenization solutions for securing cardholder data. As the first organization in the payments industry to engineer and deploy tokenization technology, EPX welcomes Visa’s focus on and validation of tokenization solutions.

In version 1.0 of the Visa Best Practices for Tokenization document, Visa establishes best practices related to four critical components of tokenization: token generation, token mapping, card data vault, and cryptographic key management. Visa provides further recommendations regarding tokenization system configuration, implementation, and management, and offers guidance on the management of historical data.

EPX, which has offered merchants tokenization technology since 2001, abides by one hundred percent of the best practices established by Visa and views the best practices as reinforcement of EPX’s approach to tokenization. According to EPX Chief Security Officer Matt Ornce, “Visa is now confirming what we have been saying and practicing for years. Merchants that properly implement a sound tokenization solution are able to limit cardholder data storage in their environments. In turn, this simplifies merchant PCI DSS assessments by reducing the scope of their compliance requirements, associated costs, and implementation. This makes merchants of any size more secure and brings them into compliance easier, faster, and with less expense.”

Further validating EPX’s approach to payment data security, a June 2010 security brief released by RSA provides insight into how tokenization can be combined with payment processing outsourcing to relieve merchants of the burden and potential costs associated with securing cardholder payment data. Using an EPX client who annually processes tens of thousands of ecommerce transactions as an example, RSA pointed out that the merchant organization substantially reduced its PCI compliance burden. The security brief also establishes that, over the next several years, many payment processing organizations will introduce outsourced payment services to manage cardholder data risks on behalf of merchants. The brief provides additional insight by stating that the most effective outsourced payment services will use a combination of tokenization and encryption.

EPX has provided payment card security outsourcing for ten years and was the first payment processor to actually market, sell, and implement a solution that uses both tokenization and encryption for securing card data from the card swipe through the entire transaction lifecycle. By processing through EPX, individual merchants have reduced their initial PCI compliance burden by millions of dollars and continue to realize significant annual savings.

EPX welcomes the third-party validation of payment processing outsourcing and the use of tokenization plus encryption technologies. “It is great to see that leaders in the payments and security industries are recognizing EPX’s accomplishments,” EPX Chief Executive Officer Ray Moyer said.

The Tokenization Bandwagon Is Music to Our Ears

Wednesday, June 23rd, 2010

In May, EPX issued a press release entitled “Electronic Payment Exchange Enters its Tenth Year of Issuing Tokens for Securing Credit Card and ACH Transaction.” The fact that EPX pioneered such a novel and important technology for protecting merchants and cardholders from the risk of data compromise was not unusual.  Our company was founded in 1979 as the first independent processor of electronic checks for merchants. Since then, we’ve been consistently bringing important innovations to market.   But giving merchants and consumers the protections of  credit card data “tokenization” in early 2001 was all-the-more impressive when seen in the context of the Times.

Back then, cardholder data security was not exactly the front-of the-forehead issue that it is today.  There had not been a notable card data breach in the 35 years since revolving credit cards had been used. The first relatively large and publicized incident came just after the Y2K ball dropped in Times Square in January 2000. Online retailer CD Universe exposed 300,000 customer card records.  (Of course nowadays a breach exposing a mere 300,000 records would be considered a lucky break.) Since that first major incident, ever more damaging breaches have occurred like clockwork. Two were of Guinness proportions: retailer TJX in 2007 and processor Heartland Payments in 2009, both of which reportedly exposed more than 90 million card numbers.

When EPX started tokenizing data, Visa had just begun to formulate the first generation of data security standards.  At first, Visa’s compliance targeted only e-commerce payment gateway operators, not merchants. MasterCard did not initially see the need for standards, so offered data security consulting services. The launching of the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council was still five years away.

So, understandably, EPX’s breakthrough came with no public fan-fare and unknowable future significance. Our engineers simply were looking for a way to make transaction lifecycles and follow-on transactions more efficient, and our merchant customers more secure.  Being engineers, they didn’t call what they created ‘tokens.”  They called the codes card data “GUIDs” and “Replacement Values.” (Surprising, isn’t it, such a sexy name didn’t catch on?)  The generic catch-word for such codes, “tokens” did not come into vogue until 2005 when Las Vegas payment gateway operator and software licensor, Shift4, Inc. coined the term.  (Shift4’s process of code generation within the merchant’s environment, and their data flow is significantly different from EPX’s off-premises approach, but more or less aims at the same purpose.)

As EPX gained practical experience, naturally we kept evolving and perfecting our technology to make it more effective, practical and efficient.  As breaches kept hitting the headlines, we kept hearing loud and clear from merchants, particularly CTOs, that they would be delighted if they never had possession of the vulnerable cardholder data in the first place. And, they truly loathed having to spend so much time and IT budgets system major (non-ROI) system remediations to comply with new PCI Data Security standards.  With this guidance from the market, along came another set of EPX breakthroughs in 2005.  We invented a number of methods for at-risk card data to be securely captured and stored only by EPX and never routed to the merchant. Ever. We filed for a patent for the sophisticated processes that are now at the heart of EPX’s BuyerWall™ security suite.

As the number and scale of data breaches increased over the years and PCI compliance became mandatory and urgent, the IT Establishment naturally first turned to the familiar techniques they had been taught in schools and had been using for decades: encryption, firewalls and other data “hardening” techniques. Several front-end only gateway operators had been offering forms of tokenization.  There also were several companies providing software-as-service (SaaS) outsourced tokenization and still others selling do-it-yourself in situ tokenization hardware and software to merchants.  Yet, tokenization remained mostly marginalized as an emerging technology …and too-good-to-be-true… by Conventional Wisdom.

Then, a funny thing happened along the way to achieving cardholder security Nirvana:  Heartland.  Heartland Payments and others quickly became iconic in proving that Encryption Does Not Necessarily Equal Security.  Since Heartland, hard-pressed CTOs and cash-strapped CFOs have been gradually opening their minds and wallets to alternative security approaches like tokenization.

Yet, oddly, EPX stood alone for all these years as the ONLY full authorization / capture /clearing / settlement processor providing tokenization.   The giant end-to-end processors like Global Payments, TSYS, Elevon, Fifth Third, and First Data Corporation stayed on the sidelines, leaving it to their merchants to solve the card data security problem on their own. Finally, in 2009 Fifth Third Bank (which has its own in-house front and back-end processing) and then First Data (the world’s largest processor) respectively launched their versions tokenization. JPMorgan Chase’s Paymentech merchant acquiring company is not a self-contained end-to-end processor, but in the past few months has been sporadically promoting its Orbital gateway as having tokenization capabilities…although they appear to be using bolted-on functionality provided by a third-party vendor.

Tokenization is not only a solution for credit cards, but also for other forms of payment.  A few weeks ago, ProPay, a well-respected Salt Lake City-based payment ecommerce gateway company, made a nationwide announcement that it can now can encrypt and then tokenize electronic check routing and account holder data that is used in ACH transactions.  Likewise, on May 19th, Sarasota, NY-based ACH Payments, Inc. said it now will tokenize checking account numbers used in its ACH processing.  ProPay’s COO was quoted as saying: “ProPay is leading the industry and applying the same technology for protecting payment card information to the protection of ACH data…”  We at EPX appreciate the executive’s exuberance; however, the “leading the industry” part was a bit over-stated considering that EPX started tokenizing ACH transaction data as well – more than nine years ago.

EPX always knew that what we innovated in 2001 would not suffice as the complete answer to data protection. Tokenization, for sure, is elegant and powerful…and is especially cost-effective for complex enterprises with lots of locations and transactions. It mitigates the vast majority of cardholder data risk – substituting codes for card numbers stored or “in motion.”  In the case e-commerce transactions, the vulnerable data can be directly captured, encrypted and tokenized from the moment a customer or clerk keys in the data.

However, things are a little more complicated for retail POS “swipe” transactions. The card data can be potentially vulnerable for what I call the “first inch” – i.e., the momentary transit between the magnetic stripe to the point the data reaches the POS terminal or the payment module within a POS retail management systems’ software.  Although only briefly exposed, the can be skimmed or otherwise criminally compromised.  Also, such exposed card data at the front end-point of a transaction remains ‘in scope’ and subject to more cumbersome PCI Data Security Standards reporting.

We at EPX knew this was a problem to be eventually solved.  We watched with particular interest last October as First Data Corporation and RSA (the security division of EMC Corp.) announced their solution: instant encryption as the data is captured by a POS terminal, then tokenization of the data once it is captured by First Data’s processing platform. They call their product (still being field tested) “TransArmor.”

We applaud First Data’s adoption of encryption+tokenization and expect the technology to be a game-changer in the industry due to the huge number of merchants FDC supports.  And we welcomed the recent announcement by TransFirst’s Payment Processing International subsidiary (an ISO with a gateway) of offering encryption+tokenization capability.   However, true-to-form, all this big news is déjà vu for EPX.   In July 2009, EPX already had become the first processor in the world to introduce just such a solution –encryption of data all the way from the mag stripe to EPX’s firewall, then tokenization of the data once it entered our processing environment.  EPX’s encryption + tokenization is functionally consistent with what First Data/RSA and PPI later announced.  EPX uses an encrypting swipe device to capture the vulnerable data.  We hold the only decryption key to the swiped data in our secure processing environment (i.e., neither the merchant nor any other party ever has access to the decryption key).  We and our merchants use EPX BRICs (tokens) exclusively as transaction reference codes for all operational reference purchases thereafter.

These days there are an increasing number of companies offering what might be broadly called “tokenization.”  The differences between approaches can be hard to discern.  The most important differentiator, however, is in the fundamental integrity of the token creation protocols.   From the beginning, EPX engineers had the foresight to not take the obvious short-cut of simply creating the token algorithms from credit card numbers and banking account numbers.  EPX codes, instead, are based upon the unique and very specific characteristics of each specific transaction and its place in time, among other characteristics.  In retrospect, as criminal rings have become so much more skilled at reverse-engineering financial account numbers, we now know how much more secure is the EPX approach than others.  If the card number, or checking account number is not in the merchants systems – or the source of the tokens – the data cannot be stolen and deciphered.  In other words, it has no “street value.”

In the 31 years EPX has been in payments business we have made many breakthroughs by simply pursuing what is most effective, what is most efficient and what serves our merchants best.  We never have waited for others to lead the way, nor will we in the future.

Posted by Charles S. Crawford
Executive Vice President
Strategic DevelopmentElectronic Payment Exchange

Evolving Pragmatic Approaches to Payments Security – Part 2 of 2

Wednesday, April 28th, 2010

In this multi-part article, EPX Chief Security Office Matt Ornce comments on the payments security happenings of 2009 and looks forward to 2010.

Evolving Pragmatic Approaches to Payments Security – Part 2 of 2

What’s In Store for 2010 and Beyond

The key payment security events discussed above offer some direction for trends that are likely to continue into 2010 and indicate new areas that will gain prominence.

The well-publicized and continuous stream of data breaches that came to light in 2009 has forced merchants, solution providers, standards organizations, and the card brands themselves to begin taking a more pragmatic approach to payment security. Beyond the actual costs associated with fines, lawsuits, card replacements, and security upgrades, merchants are learning that damaged reputations, negative publicity, and loss of business also have deep and sometimes unsurvivable bottom-line impacts.

A growing recognition of these potential data breach costs has led merchants to challenge the status quo of slowly developing regulations and conventional technologies that together have not been enough to stem the data breach tide. As a result, increasing numbers of merchants are seeking new solutions that materially protect their data.

Increased Focus on Smaller Merchant Compliance

While the number of credit card numbers breached per month has generally been trending down in 2009, there’s no reason to suggest that the total number of breaches will subside any time soon. As larger entities have shored up their defenses, increasingly smaller entities are being directly targeted.

PCI compliance is required for all entities that store, process or transmit cardholder data, and regulatory and risk awareness continues to grow and roll downhill to smaller merchants, who, according to Visa statistics, make up 99% of the merchant base and account for roughly one-third of all transactions. Current PCI compliance deadlines, fines, and threats of loss of processing privileges focus on Level 1 and 2 merchants, but it’s natural to assume that the smaller Level 3 and 4 merchants are next. Several acquirers have already begun to fine their noncompliant Level 3 and 4 merchants in an effort to push them into compliance.

Increased Legislative Threats

Is 2010 the year for state level breach notification laws to be aggregated into federal law? Probably not, but it’s coming, and might actually be a welcome piece of legislation for those organizations who unfortunately need to struggle with the 46 different state laws. Such legislation could also help streamline the current time-sensitive notification process.

Beyond the financial fraud perpetrated for personal gain, the use of breached cardholder data as a funding source for terrorist activities has been clearly established by the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service and others, providing a clear impetus for federal regulation of cardholder data security.

Continued Challenges to PCI DSS

The PCI DSS will continue to see its share of challenges. As threats continue to evolve and new technologies surpass the standard’s effectiveness, the PCI DSS’s ability to keep pace will be questioned. Certainly, it’s a delicate balance between deploying new standards faster than the market can bear, and reacting slower than the threats evolve.

New technologies and new threats will always be ahead of the pace of regulation. The PCI Council’s investigation into technologies that help merchants achieve compliance and protect the payment system is certainly encouraging, but the codified results of the PWC study may not be seen for another 12 to 24 months. Meanwhile, the market will inevitably continue to evolve, maturing existing technologies and developing new. The council needs to find the means to distribute guidance faster, even if it’s through the use of best practice bulletins, like Visa’s, that can be issued quickly and eventually adopted into the DSS as requirements.

Until standards for the new technologies are sanctioned, there will be a greater reliance on merchants and QSAs to understand the differences in implementations and their implications on cardholder data security.

Mainstream Acceptance of New Technologies Currently Outside of PCI

With increased security risks and pressure to comply with PCI, merchants will flock to solutions that remove cardholder data from their environments in even greater numbers in 2010. Even though many of the technologies have existed for years, they were considered fringe players until only recently. Compounding the issue, especially with tokenization, has been a flood of new vendors to the space, which has created an impression that the entire field is populated with products that are only months old.

While planned product announcements by larger industry players like First Data, RSA, Hypercom and others may help legitimize these technologies, announcements won’t help merchants against current threats or regulation. Merchants will continue to seek the vendors already in the space and will now be able to gauge them by the guidance provided in the PWC Technology Review and Visa DFE-BP. The Visa DFE-BP especially helps merchants make more informed decisions about tokenization and E2E. Early adopters have already seen the benefits of each of the aforementioned technologies in reducing PCI DSS scope and improving cardholder data security.

Combining Technologies

The preliminary PWC findings suggest that E2E and tokenization can each reduce PCI scope when they are implemented independently of each other, and Visa’s best practices illustrate that they can be combined to even greater effect. As individual technologies become more mainstream, merchants will recognize even greater cardholder data protection from the hybrid solutions.

End-to-end encryption and tokenization are complementary technologies that provide protection for a different part of the transaction, as hinted at in the Visa DFE-BP. E2E, of course, protects the request portion of the POS transaction by encrypting track data from the swipe to the processor. Tokens provided in the response portion of the transaction provide protection “for business processes that requires the primary account number to be utilized after authorization, such as processing of recurring payments, customer loyalty programs or fraud management.” Used together, merchants dramatically reduce their risk without necessarily impacting their customers’ checkout experiences.

In ecommerce, outsourcing the page that takes cardholder data, in combination with using tokens, is another way technologies can be combined for even greater security. Merchants will reduce risk and PCI scope by eliminating card numbers in their processing systems with cardholder data being taken directly from the consumer and given directly to the PCI-compliant outsourced provider. Depending on the solution, they may still be able to maintain full control over their customer’s checkout experience without taking cardholder data.

Clarification of Technologies

The Visa DFE-BP provides an excellent starting point for best practices regarding E2E and tokenization implementations, but the PCI Council does not currently plan on providing definitive guidance on the topic until late 2010. To assist the PCI Council in establishing guidelines, I have submitted the following points as minimum goals for E2E and tokenization deployments:

  • New methodologies must be vetted for security and practicality, which can take years to certify. However, the reapplication of existing standards, such as TDES and DUKPT, is a legitimate strategy to reduce or eliminate this delay.
  • Encryption must start at the swipe reader. Anything beyond that point opens an area of vulnerability for the merchant.
  • The endpoint, from the merchant’s perspective, must be at least the next upstream provider. The farther upstream the data can stay encrypted, the better it is for the security of the entire payment industry. At the very least, the data should be kept out of plaintext at the merchant’s location.
  • Merchants cannot have access to E2E encryption keys. Granting them access to the keys would defeat the purpose and value of encryption within the merchant environment and would throw PCI key management requirements back to the merchant.
  • Tokens should have no relationship to the card numbers they protect so that they cannot be reverse engineered. (Format-preserving encryption is in this category, and should therefore be avoided.)
  • Merchants should allow providers to generate tokens. If tokens are generated in-house, then corresponding card data must also be kept in-house, which defeats much of the merchant benefit of tokenization. In such a scenario, merchants are still responsible for data protection and liable for data loss. They would see no regulatory relief or PCI scope reduction.

Conclusion

While the influential payment security events of 2009 have caused some instability and uncertainty in the payments industry, we need to view the events and the lessons learned from them as opportunities for solution providers to further define and shape the industry in 2010.

Discussions of best practices and PCI DSS revisions are constructive, but it’s not enough to merely talk about change. The marketplace needs solutions today. It is incumbent upon us to offer our support and guidance to the PCI Council and card organizations with hopes that we can bring about positive change in the near term.

Likewise, in 2010 we will see the true innovators in payment security continue to deliver powerful and proven solutions to the marketplace, while the announcements of planned products get lost in the shuffle. As merchants continue to gain knowledge about data breach risks and PCI compliance, they will become savvy in recognizing technologies that are nothing more than promises or vaporware, and they will move toward accepting solutions from providers with proven track records.

MATT ORNCE is the CSO of Electronic Payment Exchange, and has more than 20 years experience in IT, payments and security.

Evolving Pragmatic Approaches to Payments Security – Part 1 of 2

Wednesday, April 21st, 2010

In this multi-part article, EPX Chief Security Office Matt Ornce comments on the payments security happenings of 2009 and looks forward to 2010.

Evolving Pragmatic Approaches to Payments Security – Part 1 of 2

Reviewing the trends in 2009 to speculate on the payments landscape in 2010

Several interesting events have shaken the payment card industry from the status quo in 2009, and reactions to these events are influencing the industry’s future. We have witnessed changing views, maturation of guidelines, and security advances related to massive data breaches. Additionally, government legislation, end-to-end encryption, PCI standards, and best practices have been introduced, and we are beginning to see their effects.

Influential payment security events of 2009 – and some forward-looking views for 2010 – are discussed below.

Influential 2009 Payment Security Events

Data Breaches

Credit card and other payment-related data breaches have become widespread in the past decade, and recent technological advances by criminal hackers, identity thieves and terrorist organizations are putting the world–merchants, payment processors, card brands, governments, and consumers–on notice.

One could argue that data breach notification laws have improved incident reporting, artificially creating more news today from smaller breaches that once went unreported. No one can dispute, however, that in the same time hackers have become significantly better organized and their attacks continue to quickly evolve and have become much more sophisticated and effective. In 2009, data breaches continued to occur: from the largest breach ever, announced in January, to the victims whose data is available for sale today, but are still unaware they’ve even been breached.

PCI DSS Effectiveness Questioned

Some concern has been raised that the PCI Data Security Standard (DSS) has not been effective enough in reducing the number and severity of data breaches, especially when entities that appeared to be compliant were breached.

In March, a House subcommittee met to review the state of affairs. Dave Hogan, National Retail Federation CIO and vocal PCI DSS detractor, gave voice to merchant frustration by characterizing PCI as “an elaborate patch”. He further noted that “the ultimate solution is to stop requiring merchants to store card data in the first place.”

At the October 2009 PCI Participating Organization meeting, even Bob Russo, PCI Security Standards Council General Manager, admitted that, “Compliance doesn’t equal security.”

End-to-End Encryption

End-to-end encryption (E2E) was brought to the forefront in mid-2009 as one solution with the potential to significantly help merchants protect their data and even reduce their PCI compliance burdens. Unfortunately, with an overly-ambitious definition of “from the merchant to the issuer,” merchants are no better off today than before the initial hype.

Defining such a broad industry goal is admirable, but if PCI compliance levels are any indication, the effort will take years to develop the standards and re-tool the entire industry to pass encrypted card data from end to end. In the meantime, merchants still need protection against continuously evolving threats, and need solutions that don’t make them individually responsible for saving the entire payment industry.

PCI / PricewaterhouseCoopers Technology Review

During August 2009, the PCI Council directed PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) to perform market research on emerging technologies that can improve merchant compliance rates and reduce risks and costs associated with PCI compliance. PWC focused on E2E and tokenization, tacitly validating each approach by recognizing that “These solutions are designed to address some of the inherent risks in the current payment card processes and infrastructure.”

The PCI Council is currently reviewing the PWC data and is likely to incorporate guidance into future PCI DSS revisions, but probably not until late in 2010.

Visa Data Field Encryption Best Practice (DFE-BP)

In October, Visa quickly followed up PWC’s technology review with several key best practices for E2E, effectively filling the gap before the scheduled PCI DSS updates. Most notably, Visa defined in their best practices document the initial “ends” as “from the swipe to the acquirer processor,” which minimizes their own remediation requirements by reducing the proposed industry-wide E2E goals, but increases the immediacy in which merchants can benefit.

The document also recommends using, “an alternate account or transaction identifier [aka token] for business processes that requires the primary account number to be utilized after authorization, such as processing of recurring payments, customer loyalty programs or fraud management.” This guidance further validates E2E and tokenization technology implementations, especially those aligned with the best practices.

BJs, Heartland Got Off the Hook Legally, but Lost in the Court of Public Opinion

Tuesday, December 22nd, 2009

By: Chuck Crawford

On December 11, the Massachusetts Supreme Court dismissed a class action suit by dozens of credit unions against BJ’s Wholesale Club.  BJ’s, based in Framingham, MA, has more than 8 million consumer shopping club members.  The plaintiffs were claiming substantial damages after more than 8 million of its credit cardholder records were compromised in 2004. They maintained that BJ’s was negligent in not adequately safeguarding customer credit card data.

Two weeks before the BJ’s decision, a New Jersey district court judge summarily dismissed a class action suit by shareholders and others against Heartland Payment Systems, Inc.  Heartland is a NYSE-listed provider of merchant credit card processing that had as many as 130 million credit card records compromised in late 2008 – making incident the largest credit card data breach in history.  The complaint claimed that Heartland had publicly misrepresented the level of its data security diligence leading up to the incident and should have done more to prevent the exposure of data.

The dismissals appear to be based largely upon narrow legal arguments, such as whether the plaintiffs had proper standing to bring such an action, and whether tangible damages could be proven.  In both decisions the courts concluded that, despite their loss of data, the companies had not publicly misrepresented their level of diligence in protecting cardholder data entrusted to them.

While the courts’ actions were decisive legal victories, and set precedents in the tort community foretelling that such class actions claiming extraordinary damages from breaches might not be so easy to prove in the future, otherwise the litigations were somewhat anti-climatic and beside the point.

In the higher court of public opinion, BJ’s and Heartland, TJX, Hannaford Brothers Supermarkets and the dozen other major credit card breach targets of the past decade already had been sentenced to a lost measure of hard-earned brand reputation from the moment their breaches were disclosed.  The degree to which the public trust dissipates when there is a breach varies depending upon the size of the breach, the nature of the business and the deftness of each company’s response to the crisis. Are these companies cast as victims of a crime, or – by lax security misfeasance – unwitting accomplices?

A company’s reputation has a value far beyond quantitative dollar damages.  That is why, especially, merchants that trade on trust– such as insurance companies, banks, lenders and other payment services – are often looking beyond the arguable validation of safety that comes with Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards compliance. Instead, they are more concerned about finding a virtually fool-proof way to prevent a data compromise whether or not it is beyond the PCI guidelines.

As long as cardholder data remains in the merchants system in any form, encrypted or not, there is some chance of accidental or malicious data compromise, especially when the data, or the decryption codes to the data, are “in motion” traveling between servers, databases and parties.

On the other hand, tokenization, like EPX’s patent-pending BuyerWall™ suite of  card data replacement code technologies, offers merchants as close to absolute reputation protection as is possible today.  With BuyerWall, at-risk card numbers never reside in a merchant’s IT systems in the first place; there is nothing of value to be lost or stolen.  At-risk cardholder data is substituted with BuyerWall ‘BRIC” transaction reference codes.  BRIC codes (sometimes referred to as “tokens”). BRICs are safer than encryptions because they i) are not derived from credit card numbers and ii) the original data is not kept in the merchant’s environment. The sensitive card data is vaulted safely in EPX’s ultra-secure environment – subject to the most rigorous PCI external auditing and other requirements.

As it happens, elimination of card data through tokenization also greatly simplifies PCI compliance and remediation by taking most of a merchant’s card data topography effectively ‘out of scope.’  But, for the many merchants focused on brand risk more than arbitrary rules or security costs, it is the near certainty of data security that can come the absence of card data that gives C-level executives and directors one less surprise to worry about at night.

In Search Of A Quick Fix For Cardholder Data Security, Merchants Need Not Look So Far

Friday, December 18th, 2009

By: Charles Crawford

In a by-lined piece published in cio.com, well-respected security expert and author Ben Rothke wrote “…people don’t want to invest in long-term security plans. They want their security band-aid now, despite the fact they have never built security into their designs or processes.”  He went on to praise the PCI Security Council’s vision: “The genius of the PCI DSS (and when PCI is compared to regulations such as SoX and GLBA, genius is indeed an appropriate term) is that it has sensible concepts such as an open formal feedback process, trend analysis, impact evaluation, guidance and much more built into the very fabric of the standard.”

I find myself usually agreeing with Rothke’s well-reasoned perspectives.  Indeed, it is especially easy to agree that businesses should have a culture that promotes holistic security, must not consider compliance an end unto itself, and that the processes of security must evolve ahead of the threats.

Where I take issue with Rothke’s article, “PCI Debate Ignores Planned Improvement Cycle,” is in the apparent limitation of his perspective to traditional security remediation solutions.  If the path to sufficient cardholder data security certainty can be achieved only through ratcheted, ever-more-effective and pervasive layers of encryption, firewalling, intrusion prevention and other hardening, then I suppose Rothke’s point is well taken, albeit worrisome. What follows logically is that merchants should “man up” and embrace a future of never ending “improvement cycles” that require lots of money, effort, time and discipline (notably external discipline) in their quixotic journey toward “breach-proof” data.

What is taken too lightly is the role innovation already is playing.   Less costly and pragmatic ways of avoiding data compromise are fast gaining acceptance as viable alternative among recession-weary merchants.

The PCI Council got it right when they set as milestone #1 of their Prioritized Approach to Pursue Standard Compliance Remove sensitive authentication data and limit data retention.” EPX, for one, provides merchants a pre-emptive solution with exactly that purpose: total elimination of cardholder data from merchant systems so that it can’t be lost or stolen.

Conventional thinking is for merchants to use matrix of remedial techniques, gambling that the data they hold will so be perfectly  sequestered and disguised it might not get compromised – at least, if everything works as planned and criminals don’t get any more clever.

EPX, on the other hand, concluded that the surest way to avoid data loss is for the merchant never to have the data in the first place. Instead of keeping card data, EPX merchants operate normally using GUID transaction reference codes called BRICs.  BRICs are used as card numbers would otherwise be, for transaction receipts, customer service returns, refunds, chargeback responses, follow-on purchases and all other operational and financial purposes.   BRICs are not encryptions and not derived from credit card numbers, therefore have no street value if lost or stolen from the merchant.

For EPX, tokenization comes as no band-wagon initiative like we now are seeing from Paymentech, First Data and others. In fact, EPX started routinely processing with “replacement values codes” in 2001 …three years before the first PCI Standards were published.  Our processes evolved over the years into the comprehensive, patent-pending suite of cardholder data security technologies we now call BuyerWall™.

As the Council and many others have said, there is no “silver bullet,” no single solution – even tokenization.  We make no claim that EPX BRICs are such.  Yet, properly constructed and managed tokenization also is no “band-aid” that Rothke so wisely mocks. When the card numbers are gone, they’re gone. There’s not much left for the merchant to safeguard. And, once implemented, EPX requires no extraordinary “improvement cycles” or investments to maintain the security of the data.  In fact, security of the data becomes a responsibility for which EPX is well prepared, since, as a processor, we have always had to take special care with data and are subject to the PCI SCC’s most rigorous compliance requirements (Level 1).

Is it so, that “people want their…security now No doubt about it. But, I say “why not?” Merchants deserve pragmatic solutions that can achieve even a higher standard of security without costly and cumbersome techniques that may or may not ultimately prove effective enough.

Rothke says there is genius in the PCI’s process of ever-evolving standards.  I think their real genius of the Council is its professed technologic agnosticism which, generally, is supposed to allow merchants to achieve card data security with whatever technology and processes work best for them.  In that spirit, merchants have more to choose from than Rothke seemed to acknowledge.

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Charles Crawford is EVP of Strategic Development for EPX


[1] http://www.cio.com/article/495093/PCI_Debate_Ignores_Planned_Improvement_Cycle?taxonomyId=3000; June 2009